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Abstract. The uncanny valley hypothesis predicts that an entity appearing almost human risks 
eliciting cold, eerie feelings in viewers. Categorization-based stranger avoidance theory identifies 
the cause of this feeling as categorizing the entity into a novel category. This explanation is 
doubtful because stranger is not a novel category in adults; infants do not avoid strangers while 
the category stranger remains novel; infants old enough to fear strangers prefer photographs of 
strangers to those more closely resembling a familiar person; and the uncanny valley’s 
characteristic eeriness is seldom felt when meeting strangers. We repeated our original experiment 
with a more realistic 3D computer model and found no support for categorization-based stranger 
avoidance theory. By contrast, realism inconsistency theory explains cold, eerie feelings elicited 
by transitions between instances of two different, mutually exclusive categories, given that at least 
one category is anthropomorphic: Cold, eerie feelings are caused by prediction error from 
perceiving some features as features of the first category and other features as features of the 
second category. In principle, realism inconsistency theory can explain not only negative 
evaluations of transitions between real and computer modeled humans but also between different 
vertebrate species. 
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1. 3D computer model is a distinct and familiar category
The crux of the commentators’ argument is twofold. First, they claim categorization-based
stranger avoidance explains our data and, thus, the uncanny valley effect. Their theory is that 
stranger avoidance “is triggered when an object has an improbable appearance and is therefore 
categorized into a novel class” (Kawabe, Sasaki, Ihaya, & Yamada, 2016). Second, they claim our 
experiment, which used stimuli varying from a person’s 3D computer modeled face to a 
photograph, is not valid because 3D computer model is not a distinct category; like the real person 
in the photograph, it is just another instance of the category human being, though an instance with 
computer modeled features. Therefore, they conclude that our stimuli do not transition between 
two different categories and advise us to “use a stimulus category dimension with a wider range 
containing a nonhuman entity, an ambiguous entity, and a human being.”  
Their argument is logically inconsistent. If our experiment did not entail a category transition 
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(second claim) because a 3D computer model of a human being is still perceived as an instance of 
the category human being, there would be no “novel class” and, hence, per their theory, no uncanny 
valley effect (first claim). 
We disagree that a hand-drawn cartoon or a doll are instances of nonhuman categories while a 
3D computer model and a real person are instances of the category human. (In their experiment, 
Yamada, Kawabe, and Ihaya, 2013, created morphs from the face of the Charlie Brown character 
to the face of a Japanese man.) A 3D computer model, hand-drawn cartoon, and doll can all be 
used to depict humans—in which case they are all depictions within the category human. 
Within the category human, in our original experiment, we instructed participants to 
distinguish the real from the computer animated. In the demographics survey, our US participants 
reported watching films, videos, and television programs with 3D computer-animated human 
characters 3.65 hours per week on average (SD = 6.07, n = 365). They also reported playing 
videogames with 3D computer-animated human characters 4.54 hours per week (SD = 7.54) and 
having played them for 7.33 years (SD = 5.96). Clearly our participants’ long-term exposure should 
have been sufficient to establish 3D computer model as a distinct category. 
In our experiment, the 3D computer model (0% real) was eeriest, which we attributed to 
prediction error caused by its features being perceived as features of different categories 
(MacDorman & Chattopadhyay, 2016; cf. Moore, 2012); eeriness declined as the stimuli transition 
to 100% real. The commentators claim their theory explains this decline because as stimuli appear 
more human they “can be better categorized into a familiar class.” This explanation is contradicted, 
however, by the fact that the 100% 3D computer model was categorized with the greatest certainty 
and rapidity (greater even than 100% real, figure 4 and 7, top left). This result indicates 3D 
computer model is a familiar category with a probable appearance, distinct from real. Further 
evidence is the logistic, nearly symmetrical curve with tight confidence intervals for percentage 
categorized as real (figure 4, top left). This pattern is consistent with a transition from one known 
category to a different known category (figure 6a of Feldman, Griffiths, & Morgan, 2009; figure 
19.1 of Harnad, 1987). In fact, if the labels were removed, it would be impossible to deduce 
whether the transition were from 3D computer model to real or vice versa. 
Furthermore, we are concerned when the commentators write, “stranger avoidance is not 
driven simply by categorization difficulty that can be quantified by measuring categorization 
latency.” In their earlier paper, categorization difficulty was operationalized as categorization 
latency, and their result—that the least likable stimulus in the transition was also the stimulus with 
the longest latency—was interpreted as supporting their theory (experiment 1 and 2 in Yamada, 
Kawabe, & Ihaya, 2013). This repudiates their own experimental methodology used to support 
categorization-based stranger avoidance theory. Thus, the commentators should propose another 
way to test their theory’s predictions, assuming their theory is falsifiable. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Stimuli ratings of subjective realism, eeriness, warmth, and familiarity are plotted against their fraction of real 
as are percentage categorized as real and response time. For eeriness and warmth, the regression line for ½ to 100% 
real is shown in red and for 0% to 100% real is dashed. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. 
2. Experiment 
The commentators’ theory would predict that an improbable appearance elicits the uncanny 
valley effect (hypothesis 1) and the effect disappears as the appearance becomes more probable 
(hypothesis 2). They identified this trend along the control transition in our original experiment, 
with eeriness decreasing from 3D computer model (0% real) to photograph (100% real). However, 
we assume this trend was caused by inconsistency in the realism of the features of the 3D computer 
models. This is because some features were harder to model and, therefore, appeared less realistic 
than others. To address the issue of inconsistent feature realism, we created a more realistic 3D 
computer model for this experiment. 
To test the above hypotheses, we recruited 74 undergraduate and graduate students (37% 
female) from a Midwestern university (Mage = 23.8, SD = 5.1) in September 2016 and conducted 
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a within-group experiment following our prior methodology (section 2.4–2.6 of MacDorman & 
Chattopadhyay, 2016), though starting with image ratings, followed by a demographics 
questionnaire, and finishing with the categorization task. Each participant rated and categorized 
seven images of a woman varying by sixths from 0% real (3D computer model) to 100% real 
(photograph) as either computer animated or real (Figure 1a).  
Each image was categorized four times—twice in the first block and twice in the second—
with presentation order randomized in each block. Each block started with two unrelated warm-up 
images and included 20 other images. “Categorize the face below as quickly and as accurately as 
you can” appeared above the image. The anchors computer animated and real appeared on 
opposite sides of the image, left–right counterbalanced between blocks. “Press e” appeared below 
the left anchor and “Press i” below the right. 
The independent variable (IV) was the woman’s fraction of real in the image (0, ⅙, ⅓, ½, ⅔, ⅚, 
1). All changes in the IV were of equal size. Dependent variables for each image were percentage 
categorized as real, response time, and ratings on the 7-point semantic differential scales for 
realism (computer-animated–real, replica–original, and digitally copied–authentic), familiarity 
(rarely seen–common, unfamiliar–recognizable, and unique–familiar), eeriness (ordinary–creepy, 
plain–weird, and predictable–eerie), and warmth (cold-hearted–warm-hearted, hostile–friendly, 
and grumpy–cheerful). 
A manipulation check confirmed that realism increased with fraction of real (Figure 1b). The 
3D computer was also rated higher in realism (M = –1.82, SD = 1.62, n = 74) than the six human 
models of the original experiment (M = –2.59, SD = 1.03, n = 651). Certainty decreased from 0% 
to ½ real and then increased to 100% real (c). The most certain image was 0% real, which was 
categorized as computer animated 90% of the time (c) and had the fastest response time (d); the 
most ambiguous image was ½ real, which was categorized as real 54% of the time (c). This is the 
most improbable image. 
Contrary to hypothesis 1, the most improbable image was not the eeriest; instead, the most 
certain image was the eeriest (c). Contrary to hypothesis 2, eeriness did not decrease as the 
appearance increased from the most improbable to 100% real (e). In fitting a regression line from 
the most improbable image (½ real) to 100% real, there was no significant change in eeriness (adj. 
R2 = .006, F[3, 289] = 1.62, p = .184, e) or warmth (adj. R2 = .004, F[3, 289] = 1.40,  p = .244, f). 
Across the full range from 0 to 100% real, eeriness increased significantly, though with a negligible 
effect size (adj. R2 = .042, F[6, 506] = 4.72, p < .001); warmth (i.e., likeability) did not change 
significantly (adj. R2 = .004, F[6, 506] = 1.32,  p = .245). 
Increases in fraction of real produced the largest increase in realism (b) and in familiarity (g) 
between 0% and ⅙ real and the largest decrease in eeriness. As in this experiment, elsewhere we 
have found the 3D computer model (0% real) to be subjectively rated as least familiar 
(Chattopadhyay & MacDorman, figure 6). We propose this finding is explained but by perceptual 
narrowing: Human infants learn to discriminate human faces better than faces of other species 
(Pascalis, de Haan, & Nelson, 2002). Perceptual narrowing causes a human face that varies from 
human norms to appear unfamiliar. We found reducing consistency in feature realism elicits cold, 
eerie feelings only when it also reduces familiarity, which we interpret as supporting the role of 
perceptual narrowing in the uncanny valley effect (Chattopadhyay & MacDorman, 2016). 
3. Stranger avoidance cannot explain why novelty should elicit cold, eerie feelings 
The commentators explain the uncanny valley as a “general cognitive function to emotionally 
evaluate an object.” However, they then conflate this general function with a specific phenomenon, 
stranger avoidance, and a specific mechanism, a danger avoidance system: “humans tend to avoid 
strangers who could potentially harm them physically or impair their genetic fitness” (Yamada, 
Kawabe, & Ihaya, 2013, p. 30). They then cite (indirectly through LeDoux) findings on identical 
twins (Mage = 22 mo.) indicating a fear of strangers has a genetic component (Plomin & Rowe, 
1979). In this context, though, the fear is a heritable trait and not a general cognitive function. 
Any experiment on stranger avoidance should include among its stimuli not only strangers 
but also familiar persons as controls; however, little research on the uncanny valley compares 
strangers with familiar persons, and none of the commentators’ experiments have included familiar 
persons. Contrary to categorization-based stranger avoidance theory, Matsuda and colleagues 
(2012) found infants (7–12 mo.) in fact prefer a stranger’s face to the same face morphed with 
their mother’s. Beyond this finding, stranger avoidance theory may be countered by observing it 
does not relate to the uncanny valley effect: Meeting a new person seldom elicits cold, eerie 
feelings. 
Avoidance of “an object categorized as a novel class” describes fear of novelty, not stranger 
avoidance. Neophobia could be as maladaptive as neophilia (e.g., sensation seeking) when taken 
to an extreme. A healthy organism must balance the exploration of the new with the exploitation 
of the already known in part because what is new can only be understood in relation to what is 
already known. For example, human infants must first be able to distinguish a stranger from their 
mother (3–4 mo.) before they can fear the stranger (7–9 mo.); an infant’s failure to distinguish a 
stranger elicits no fear or aversion (Bronson, 1968). Stranger avoidance can only be elicited when 
the viewer categorizes a person into the known category stranger; it cannot explain why 
categorizing an entity into a novel category should elicit a negative evaluation. 
As a general cognitive function, the relation between novelty and affect is not negative but an 
inverted U (Berlyne, 1970; Lang, Bradley, Sparks, & Lee, 2007; Zuckerman, 1976): Low levels 
of novelty elicit neutral or negative affect (e.g., boredom), moderate levels elicit positive affect 
(e.g., curiosity), and high levels elicit negative affect, specifically, fear because unexpected 
outcomes can be dangerous. However, a general cognitive function cannot explain why the 
uncanny valley effect is most pronounced in viewing anthropomorphic stimuli, nor can it explain 
why its experiential quality of eeriness should be so uncommon yet so distinctive (Mangan, 2015). 
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